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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This matter is a professional malpractice action. Plaintiff/Appellant, Richard 
Sykes, filed suit against Defendants/Respondents Andrew Schepp 1 and Brady Law 
Chartered (collectively "Brady Law") for alleged professional negligence after a Notice of 
Tort Claim against the City of Boise was not filed on Mr. Sykes' behalf within the statutory 
period. This matter is before this Court after the district court's grant of summary judgment 
and award of attorney's fees and costs to Brady Law. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Mr. Sykes filed his Complaintfor Professional Malpractice against Brady Law 
on February 24, 2011. [Id., pp. 5-10] Brady Law appeared and filed an Answer to 
Complaint for Negligence and Demand for Jury Trial on April 4, 2011. [Id., pp. 18-23] In 
its Answer, Brady Law admitted that it had an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Sykes 
concerning representation for a slip-and-fall injury occurring on July 4,2010, but denied the 
remaining allegations of the Complaint. [/d., p. 20, 116] In the Answer, Brady Law also 
specifically pointed out that Mr. Sykes still had the ability to pursue recovery against parties 
potentially responsible for his injury, including event planners and contractors responsible 
1 Mr. Schepp died in an accident in October 2011 and, to date, Mr. Sykes has not 
amended his pleadings to include Mr. Schepp's estate as a party. [R., Vol. I, p. 424 n.1] 
The district court did note that its ruling would be the same if Mr. Schepp's estate was a 
party. [Id.] 
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for the setup and placement of the portable toilet that caused Mr. Sykes' alleged injury 
because the applicable statute of limitations against those parties had not yet run and that 
Mr. Sykes was advised as such. [ld.l 
On August 16, 2011, Mr. Sykes filed a motion styled as "Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Declaratory Summary Judgment," seeking a declaration that "Defendant Schepp 
violated the Idaho Rules for Review of Professional Conduct, Section-V." [ld., pp. 83-101] 
Brady Law responded to Mr. Sykes' Motion, denying that Mr. Sykes was entitled to a 
declaratory or summary judgment because the failure to file the Notice of Tort Claim was 
an isolated, honest mistake that did not give rise to a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and, even if it did, that a sing Ie violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct was 
insufficient to give rise to a viable claim for professional malpractice. [ld., pp. 191-99] 
Brady Law also argued that even if its actions did constitute professional negligence, Mr. 
Sykes was still not entitled to recovery because he could not demonstrate that Brady Law's 
actions caused his alleged damages. [/d.] On November 4,2011, Brady Law filed its own 
Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on Mr. Sykes' claims because Mr. Sykes could not prove any injury resulting 
from failure to file the Notice of Tort Claim because the City of Boise was statutorily 
immune from suit. [ld., p. 317-28] 
At a December 15, 2011, hearing, the district court heard argument on both 
parties' motions for summary judgment and took them under advisement. [Tr., Vol. I, pp. 
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1-35] On December 21,2011, the district court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order, 
dismissing Mr. Sykes' claims and granting summary judgment to Brady Law. [R., Vol. I, 
pp. 416-25] Specifically, the Court found that the City of Boise had statutory immunity from 
Mr. Sykes' contemplated personal injury action and, as such, Brady Law's failure to file the 
Notice of Tort Claim did not constitute actionable malpractice because it did not cause any 
damage to Mr. Sykes. [ld., p. 421, I. 4 - p. 424, I. 10] The Court entered a Judgment on 
January 4,2012. [ld., pp. 426-28] 
Mr. Sykes filed a Motion to Reconsider on January 4, 2012, arguing that the 
potential success of his lawsuit should have no bearing on whether Brady Law was liable 
for professional negligence. [Id., pp. 429-45] Mr. Sykes did not request a hearing on the 
Motion to Reconsider and, on January 30,2012, the district court denied Mr. Sykes' Motion 
to Reconsider on the grounds set forth in its December 21, 2011, Memorandum Decision 
and Order. [ld., pp. 460-61] The district court found that Brady Law was the prevailing 
party and awarded Brady Law its attorney's fee and costs in the amount of $14,836.50 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). [ld., pp. 462-63] Mr. Sykes filed his Notice of Appeal 
on February 13, 2012, followed by an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 8, 2012, 
alleging that the district court erred as follows: 
a) Abuse of Discretion by the Court when the 
Court failed to recognize the lawsuit as both an 
ethics violation and a fiduciary duty violation; 
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[ld., pp. 471-512] 
b) Abuse of Discretion by the Court when the 
Court awarded attorney's fees when the case 
was not frivolous or filed in bad faith; 
c) Abuse of Discretion by the Court when the 
Court allowed the Defendants/Respondents to 
bring in the City of Boise TORT argument as 
foundation to dismiss Appellant/Plaintiff's 
lawsuit; 
C. Statement of Facts 
This matter arises from injuries allegedly suffered by Appellant Richard Sykes 
on July 4,2010, while attending a fireworks display in Ann Morrison Park in Boise, Idaho 
where he tripped and fell over a curb when exiting a portable restroom. [ld., p. 416, II. 20-
22] The fall allegedly caused severe injury to both of Mr. Sykes' shoulders, requiring 
surgical treatment for tears in the right shoulder and rotator cuff as well as potential surgery 
on his left shoulder. [ld., p. 6] As a result of his injuries, Mr. Sykes consulted with Brady 
Law regarding a potential personal injury claim against those responsible for putting on the 
Ann Morrison Park fireworks display. [Id., p. 416, 11.22-24] Mr. Sykes retained Brady Law 
to institute legal action against all parties allegedly responsible for his alleged injury, 
including filing a Notice of Tort Claim against the City of Boise. [Id., p. 112; 416, II. 22-25] 
Brady Law prepared a Notice of Tort Claim as discussed with Mr. Sykes but the Notice of 
Tort Claim against the City of Boise was not filed within the statutory time period. [Id., pp. 
120-22, 201-02]. 
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On January 11, 2011, Mr. Schepp informed Mr. Sykes that his office had 
inadvertently failed to file the Notice of Tort Claim and that the time for filing had expired. 
[ld., pp. 107, 110]. Mr. Schepp also informed Mr. Sykes at that time that he could still 
pursue potential claims against the Journal Broadcast Group and the Idaho Statesman, the 
cosponsors of the event. [Id.] Mr. Sykes and Mr. Schepp terminated the attorney-client 
relationship on January 11,2011. [Id.] On March 8, 2011, Mr. Schepp informed Mr. Sykes 
that he could still proceed with his claims against other parties and that he had until July 
4, 2012, to do so. [Id., pp. 110, 125-26] Mr. Sykes subsequently filed a Complaint for 
Professional Malpractice in the matter currently before this Court. [Id., p. 417, II. 1-6] 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the district court properly found that Brady Law 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr. 
Sykes failed to present any evidence that Brady Law's 
actions caused his alleged injury. 
II. Whether the district court properly found Brady Law to 
be the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) and awarded Brady Law its attorney's fees and 
costs. 
III. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether Mr. Sykes, pursuant to I.A.R. 35 , has waived 
his right to review of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and award of attorney's fees and 
costs to Brady Law through failure to support his 
assignments of error on appeal with argument, 
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authority, and specific citations to the record. 
II. Whether Brady Law is entitled to its attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 41, I.R.C.P. 54, and 
Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
"This Court applies the same standard of review as the district court when 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment." SOignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 324, 256 
P.3d 730, 732 (2011). "Summary judgment is proper if 'the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.'" Id. (quoting Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The moving party bears the burden of 
demonstrating the absence of the existence of a question of material fact. Id. Disputed 
factual issues are generally resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id. This Court 
exercise free review over issues of law. Id. 
When reviewing the district court's award of attorney's fees, this Court applies 
an abuse ofdiscretion standard. Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Props., LLC, 148 Idaho 638, 
639, 227 P.3d 568, 569 (2010). In determining whether the district court abused its 
discretion, this Court considers whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) acted within the bounds of its discretion and reached its decision 
consistent with governing legal standards; and (3) reached its decision through the 
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exercise of reason. Id. at 639-40, 227 P.3d at 569-70. 
B. The district court's grant of Brady Law's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed because Mr. Sykes cannot provide 
a prima facie case of legal malpractice. 
The district court did not error in granting summary judgment to Brady Law 
and dismissing Mr. Sykes' legal malpractice claim because of failure to create a genuine 
issue of material fact on the element of causation and its ruling should be affirmed by this 
Court. The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove four elements: (1) the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship with the defendant; (2) defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty of care; (3) defendant breached that duty; and (4) defendant's negligence 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage. Soignier, 151 Idaho at 324,256 P.3d 
at 732. Mr. Sykes cannot demonstrate that Brady Law's failure to file the Notice of Tort 
Claim against the City of Boise constitutes actionable malpractice because it was not the 
proximate cause of damage to Mr. Sykes. 
Failure to file the Notice of Tort Claim against the City of Boise did not 
damage Mr. Sykes because he did not have any actionable claims against the City of 
Boise on the basis of its statutory immunity. Statutory immunity for municipalities such as 
the City of Boise arises under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"), Idaho Code § 6-901, et 
seq. The ITCA "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and renders a governmental 
entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions. However, it 
preserves the traditional rule of immunity in certain specific situations." Lawton v. City of 
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Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454,458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994). There are two reasons the City 
of Boise is statutorily immune from suit for Mr. Sykes' personal injuries, the negligent 
permitting exception and the discretionary function exception. 
1. Issuance of Permit Immunity 
The causation element of Mr. Sykes' malpractice claim against Brady Law 
fails on the basis of Idaho Code § 6-904B(3), which provides as follows: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within 
the course and scope of their employment and without malice 
or criminal intent and without gross negligence or reckless, 
willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho 
Code, shall not be liable for any claim which: 
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension 
or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, 
deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order or similar 
authorization. 2 
I.C. § 6-904B (footnote added). Because Mr. Sykes' claim against the City of Boise arises 
from its issuance of a permit for a special event, it would be barred under this section. 
2 "Gross negligence" is defined as "the doing or failing to do an act which a 
reasonable person in similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum 
of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such 
act and that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference in the harmful consequence to 
others." I.C. § 6-904C(1). "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct: is defined as being 
"present only when a persona intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of probability that 
such harm will result." I.C. § 6-904C(2). 
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Mr. Sykes alleges that he was injured as a result of negligence in the 
placement of a portable toilet while at the annual Ann Morrison Park fireworks display. [R., 
Vol. I, p. 7] Because the City simply approved the site plan submitted to it by the event 
planners and was not directly responsible for the placement of the toilet, its negligence, if 
any, must have been in the issuance of the permit itself. As a result, Mr. Sykes would not 
have been entitled to maintain suit against the City of Boise by operation of § 6-904B(3). 
Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of his claims against Brady Law should be 
affirmed because he was not damaged by Brady Law's alleged malpractice. 
2. Discretionary Function Immunity 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(1), a governmental entity remains immune 
for claims arising from discretionary functions. I.C. § 6-904(1). Under the discretionary 
function exception, 
Id. 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within 
the course and scope of their employment and without malice 
or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 
1. Arises out of any act or omission of an employee 
of the governmental entity exercising ordinary 
care, in reliance upon or the execution or 
performance of a statutory or regulatory function, 
whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, 
or based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a governmental 
entity or employee thereof, whether or not the 
discretion be abused. 
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There is a two-step process for determining whether the discretionary 
function applies to a given claim. First, the court examines the nature and quality of the 
challenged action. Dorea Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425, 163 
P.3d 211,214 (quoting Ransom v. City of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 204-05, 743 P.2d 
70, 72-73 (1987)). If the decision is daily, routine decision that does not involve 
consideration of policy factors, it is operational. Id. If the decision involves "consideration 
of the financial, political, economic and social effects of a policy or plan," it is discretionary. 
Id. 
"The second step is to examine the underlying policies of the discretionary 
function, which are: to permit those who govern to do so without being unduly inhibited by 
the threat of liability for tortious conduct, and also, to limit judicial re-examination of basic 
policy decisions properly entrusted to other branches of government." Id. Thus, in this 
case, the question is whether the City's decision to allow a fireworks display in a public 
park and the related decision approving a site plan involving placement of restroom 
facilities in the park during the fireworks display was discretionary or operational under 
Dorea. 
Although no Idaho case authority has directly dealt with the issue of a special 
event permit being a discretionary function, there is persuasive authority from the Idaho 
Attorney General's Office concerning statutory immunity for special event planning. In 
Attorney General Opinion No. 89-10, then attorney general Jim Jones discussed potential 
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liability for members of the legislatively created Idaho Centennial Commission for potential 
torts occurring during special events commemorating the Idaho Centennial. Idaho Op. Att'y 
Gen. 89-10, 1989 Ida. AG LEXIS 10. The opinion finds that the involvement of the Idaho 
Centennial Commission in event planning activities similar to those at issue here would 
generally fall with in the discretionary function exception of Idaho Code § 6-904(1). 
Persuasive authority is also presented in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's 
opinion in Reedv. United States Oep'tofthe Interior, 231 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 2000). In that 
case, Reed was severely injured when a car ran over the tent in which he was sleeping 
during the Burning Man Festival, which occurred on land owned by the Bureau of Land 
Management ("BLM"). Id. at 502. Reed sued the BLM under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2679, et seq., alleging, inter alia, that the BLM was negligent in approving the 
site plan for the Burning Man festival when the BLM granted a recreational permit. Id. at 
502-03. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that all of the BLM's allegedly 
negligent conduct was shielded by the discretionary function exception of the Act. Id. at 
503-04. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that "[t]he BLM was 
granted discretion to determine whether to issue the permit or no and, if issued, to decide 
the restrictions to be applied." Id. at 504. 
The Ninth Circuit went on to find that the BLM's decision to approve an event 
such as the Burning Man festival was "the type of judgment the discretionary function was 
designed to shield." Id. at 506. The court found that "[t]here was one discretionary license 
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issued for this event, and what its terms were and how those terms might be enforced were 
all discretionary." Id. The Court also noted that "where policy guidelines outline general 
policy goals regarding visitor safety, 'the means by which [government] employees meet 
these goals necessarily involves an exercise of discretion.'" Id. at 508 (quoting Valdez v. 
United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
A review of the information attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Richard 
Stubbs in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Declaratory Summary Judgment 
demonstrates that the City of Boise's decision to allow the July 4,2010, fireworks display 
at which Mr. Sykes' alleged injury occurred was discretionary. [R., Vol. I, pp. 116-90] The 
City's decision to allow a special event on City property is governed by Boise City Code, 
Title 5, Chapter 10. [Id., pp. 137-42] Under that provision, special event planners and 
organizers are required to have a special events permit issued by the City in order to 
conduct a special event and must file an application to initiate the consideration and 
approval process. [ld., pp. 121, 139, 143-46] The event planner or organizer is required 
to obtain comprehensive general liability coverage for the event and name the City as an 
additional insured certificate holder. [ld., pp. 121, 139-40, 145, 159] The event planner 
or organizer must also execute an indemnity and hold harmless agreement as part of the 
application for a special events permit, absolving the City of liability for the event planner 
or organizer's negligence. [ld., pp. 121, 145] The event planner must also submit a 
proposed site plan for the event, which would include proposed placement of restroom 
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facilities. [ld., p. 145] 
Additionally, if the City is to be a direct or indirect sponsor of the event in 
question and the event organizers request a fee waiver on that basis, the event planner or 
organizer must submit a statement of the economic benefit and fiscal costs of the event 
to the region. [ld., p. 146,422] Once completed, the application is reviewed by the Special 
Events Coordination Committee, a committee created by Boise City Code consisting of 
designated representatives from the Boise City Parks, Public Works, Police, Fire, Planning 
and Development Services, Parking Control, Risk Management, Central District Health 
Department, Ada County Highway District, Ada County Emergency Medical Services, and 
any other advisory members the mayor may designate. [Id., p. 138] 
The event under consideration by the Special Events Coordination 
Committee in this case, the Ann Morrison Park fireworks display, an event quite similar to 
centennial celebration events in the attorney's general's opinion, discussed supra, was 
cosponsored by the City of Boise; Journal Broadcast Group, Inc.; and Idaho Statesman 
Publishing, LLC. [Id., pp. 422] Thus, because the City was a joint sponsor, the Committee 
was required to consider the financial and economic impact of the event in approving the 
special events permit and site plan, indicating that the nature and quality of the decision 
made is discretionary rather than operation as it constitutes a departure from business as 
usual for the City. As evidenced by the information that must be submitted in the 
application process, the City, much like the BLM in Reed, was making a determination of 
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whether the event is consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry and the 
guests of the event, in addition to the determination of whether the event is beneficial to 
the City from a socioeconomic standpoint. Accordingly, granting the special events permits 
required the consideration of policy factors, fulfilling the first requirement of the 
discretionary function test as set forth in Dorea. 
As evidenced by the information required by the City of Boise to approve a 
special event, the approval process also constitutes a discretionary function under the 
second prong of Dorea. The special events application itself demonstrates that a key 
consideration for the City in approving special events was potential tort liability to the City 
and its departments. Given the fact that the City required comprehensive general liability 
insurance and a the execution of an indemnity agreement, [Id., pp. 121, 139-40, 145, 159], 
apportionment of potential liability was also a matter under the City's consideration. This, 
in turn, shows that in granting special events permit, the City was engaged in a governance 
activity that could result in potential tort liability. As a result, the approval process is a 
discretionary governance activity for which the City still needs the shield of sovereign 
immunity to allow it to govern outside of the cloud of impending tort liability, bringing the 
special events permitting process within the second prong of Dorea. 
Because the Dorea factors are implicated by the special events permitting 
process, this Court should find, as the district court found, that "[t]he decision whether to 
grant the permit was a matter which implicated various financial, economic, and social 
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considerations. Therefore, the City of Boise is immune from a claim of negligence with 
respect to its decision to issue an event permit." [/d., p. 423] As such, Brady Law 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
C. The district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Brady 
Law pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) should be affirmed. 
The district court properly awarded attorney's fees and costs to Brady Law 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because it was the prevailing party in an action 
involving a commercial transaction. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) "requires attorney-fee awards 
for the prevailing party in a civil action in 'any commercial transaction.'" Soignier, 151 
Idaho at 326, 256 P.3d at 724 (quoting I.C. § 12-120(3)). "The term 'commercial 
transaction' is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or 
household purposes." Id. "The commercial transaction must be integral to and the basis 
upon which a party is attempting to recover." Id. As this Court recently reaffirmed in 
Soignier, attorney's fees are available under § 12-120(3) in legal malpractice actions "so 
long as a commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing party and the party from 
whom that party seeks fees." Id. 
The district court's finding that Brady Law was a prevailing party in a matter 
concerning a commercial transaction should be affirmed because there was a contract 
between the parties to this action and this action involves alleged deficiencies in the 
provision of professional services under that contract. Mr. Sykes explicitly alleges that this 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15 
action involves a commercial transaction, noting "Defendant Brady Law represents the 
interests of Plaintiff of [sic] his contractual employment with Plaintiff and Defendant." [R., 
Vol. I, p. 6, ~ 3] The parties also entered into an "Employment Agreement" under which 
Brady Law agreed to represent the interests of Mr. Sykes in return for a contingent interest 
in the outcome of Mr. Sykes' contemplated personal injury action. [Id., p. 135-36] This 
provides a sufficient basis on which the district court could determine that there was a 
commercial transaction at issue in this case. 
Further, the district court properly found that Brady Law was the prevailing 
party. "In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action 
in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1 )(B). The 
district court's December 21,2011, Memorandum Decision and Order, [R., Vol. I, pp. 416-
25] and subsequent Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of January 31, 
2012, [Id., pp. 462-63], dismissed and affirmed the dismissal of all claims asserted against 
Brady Law in this action. This was the relief sought by Brady Law in this action. By 
contrast, all of Mr. Sykes's claims were dismissed and he obtained no relief. As such, the 
district court acted within its discretion in determining that Brady Law was a prevailing party 
and its award of fees and costs under § 12-120(3) should be affirmed. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed below, Mr. Sykes has waived any argument 
he may have concerning the validity of Brady Law's attorney's fees and costs award 
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because he failed to cite any applicable argument or authority or identify any error by 
citations to the record as required under I.A.R. 35. Mr. Sykes' argument for reversal of the 
award of attorney's fees and costs to Brady Law was that his claim was not brought 
frivolously and, thus, Brady Law was not entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121. Because Brady Law was not awarded fees and costs pursuant to 
§ 12-121, and Mr. Sykes has presented no other applicable argument or authority, this 
Court should deny his appeal and affirm the district court's fees and costs award. 
D. Mr. Sykes has waived all issues on appeal under I.A.R. 35 by 
failing to support them with relevant argument and authority in 
his opening brief. 
As this Court has reaffirmed many times, irregardless of whether a party 
elects to proceed pro se, he is required to support all issues on appeal with applicable 
argument, authority, and specific citations to error in the record before this Court. Idaho 
App. R. 35(a)(6); see also Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,790-91,229 P.3d 1146,1152-53 
(2010); Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254,257,220 P.3d 1073, 1076 
(2009). As the Court stated in Bach: 
We will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and 
authority in the opening brief." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 
Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008); see also Idaho 
App. R. 35(a)(6) ("The argument shall contain the contentions 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on 
appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, 
statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied 
upon."). Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth 
in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue 
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is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent 
argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court. 
Inama v. Boise County ex reI. Bd. of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 
330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003) (refusing to address a 
constitutional takings issue when the issue was not supported 
by legal authority and was only mentioned in passing). 
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of 
error with particularity and to support his position with sufficient 
authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be 
heard by the Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 
P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and 
conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to 
evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. 
Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 993 
(1953). This Court will not search the record on appeal for 
error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof'! Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 
400,64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to the extentthat 
an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. 
Nix, 141 Idaho 706,708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
Bach, 148 Idaho at 791,229 P.3d at 1153. Under this standard, Mr. Sykes has waived all 
issues raised on appeal. 
Mr. Sykes' opening brief fails to comply with I.A.R. 35 because nowhere in 
his brief does he point to any specific error in the record of this action or cite any salient 
authority concerning error in the district court's grant of Brady Law's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. [Appl.'s Br., pp. 2-10] While Mr. Sykes arguably cites authority applicable to 
legal malpractice claims, he does not address the substance of the district court's ruling 
or cite the relevant standard of review, but instead argues that the district court should be 
reversed because it "abuse[d] its discretion by using the unrelated injury to Appellant's 
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shoulders at the 4th of July event as a reason to dismiss Appellant's case." [Id., p. 2] Mr. 
Sykes completely fails to address the causation issue that served as the basis for the 
district court's grant of Brady Law's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Further, although mentioned in Mr. Sykes Amended Notice of Appeal, he has 
failed to raise the issue of the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Brady 
Law in his opening brief. [R., Vol. I, p. 493] As such, Mr. Sykes has waived that issue and 
it should not be considered by this Court on appeal. 
E. Brady Law is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
Brady Law is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. A party may seek attorney's fees on appeal when 
entitlement to attorney's fees on appeal is properly designated as an issue in the party's 
opening brief and applicable authority for the award of attorney's fees and costs is 
provided. Idaho App. R. 41. The applicable authority for an award of fees and costs in this 
matter comes from I.R.C.P. 54(d) and Idaho Code § § 12-120(3) and 12-121. 
Should Brady Law prevail on appeal, it is entitled to attorney's fees and costs 
under § 12-120(3) for the reasons discussed in section IV.C, supra pp. 7-9. Specifically, 
as recognized in SOignier, Brady Law will be the prevailing party in a case arising from a 
commercial transaction as memorialized in the contract between Mr. Sykes and Brady Law 
and Mr. Sykes' Complaint. [R., Vol. I, p. 6, 135-36] 
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Brady Law is also entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to § 12-121 because 
of the manner in which this appeal has been presented. Idaho Code § 12-121 "allows the 
award of attorney fees in a civil action if the appeal merely invites the Court to second 
guess the findings of the lower court." Bach, 148 Idaho at 797, 229 P.3d at 1159. 
"Attorney fees may also be awarded under section 12-121 'if the appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.' The award of fees under 
section 12-121 is within this Court's discretion." Id. (quoting Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 
Idaho 509, 514, 181 P.3d 435, 440 (2007)). In Bach, for example, this Court found that 
attorney's fees were warranted under § 12-121, stating: 
Attorney fees will be awarded against Bach. Despite the fact 
that he presented three lengthy briefs, Bach has done nothing 
more than ask the Court to second guess the findings of the 
district court and he has provided no argument or authority on 
which reversal of the district court could be based. Other than 
Bach's abiding belief that he has been the subject of a 
conspiracy and is entitled to millions of dollars in damages as 
a result, there does not appear to have been any basis for this 
appeal. 
Id. A similar situation is presented in this matter. 
Mr. Sykes' appeal in this matter is frivolous because, just as in Bach, rather 
than offer argument or authority showing that the district court engaged in an erroneous 
legal analysis in granting summary judgment to Brady Law or point to specific sections of 
the record demonstrating error, Mr. Sykes is simply asking this Court to reconsider the 
district court's opinion. Despite the fact that the district judge explained to Mr. Sykes on 
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the record that irregardless of whether he was physically injured on July 4,2010, which is 
not in dispute, he had to suffer some kind of legally cognizable injury as a result of Brady 
Law's alleged malpractice in order to be successful in a malpractice action. [Tr., Vol. I, p. 
24, I. 14 - p. 35, I. 16] Because Mr. Sykes failed to address these issues on appeal, Brady 
Law is entitled to its attorney's fees and cost on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Brady Law respectfully requests that the 
Judgment of the district court be affirmed and that Brady Law be awarded its attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2012. 
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